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INTRODUCTION TO THE
WELFARE LAW ISSUE
John J. Capowskit
This is the third consecutive year that Issue Five of the Cornell
Law Review has contained a series of Articles and Notes in the area of
welfare law.' As in the past two issues, one Note tracks recent
developments in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) Program. Another Note discusses extended unemployment
benefits. The remaining Articles and Note analyze the development
and constitutionality of the Legal Services Corporation Act (LSCA).
The juxtaposition of these analyses is fitting. Many legal services
clients are dependent upon AFDC, and legal services attorneys have
litigated with great success in AFDC cases.'
As a legal aid attorney, one witnesses the conditions in which
our poor live, and feels, albeit vicariously, the stigma and injustice
suffered. Stepping back from the daily problems of the welfare
recipient to synthesize a broader perspective on developments in
welfare law, however, provides no relief from this discouragement,
at least not for one who favors a humane public assistance program.
The development of the AFDC Program, as described in previous issues of the Cornell Law Review, 3 has been characterized by
restrictive federal and state legislation, and by administrative action
t Director, Cornell Legal Aid Clinic; A.B. 1968, Hamilton College; J.D. 1971, Cornell
University.
I For a discussion of the scope of the welfare law area see Martin, Welfare Law: The
Problem of Terminology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 792 (1975).
2 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients held entitled to
hearing before benefits discontinued); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (abolished
residency requirement as test of welfare eligibility); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(abolished state "substitute father" rule that denied benefits to eligible children whose mother
lived with employable man).
Lurie, MajorChanges in the Structureof the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
825 (1974); Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Lan-Aid to Fanilies with Dependent Children, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1975); Note, Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNE.L L. REV.
859, 861-80 (1974).
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designed to reduce AFDC expenditures. One is struck by the sheer
number of recent changes that have sought to limit the class of
eligible recipients and create presumptions against eligibility. The
basic purposes of the AFDC Program are to encourage "the care of
dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives[,] ... to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for ... selfsupport and personal independence . . . . 4 Nevertheless, federal
and state governments have attempted to accomplish a myriad of
other purposes and policies through this program.5 Such attempts
have contributed to the continuous modification and increasing
complexity of the AFDC Program. As a result, predictability and
clarity-especially desirable qualities in a program assisting persons
with generally low levels of education-are sorely lacking. 6
In studying and litigating in the welfare law area, one perceives
a cyclical pattern to its development. Although the cycle is not
unique to welfare law, it is often more pronounced than in other
areas of the law. Typically, a state adopts a restrictive administrative
practice or regulation. Litigation is subsequently initiated against the
new restriction, often proceeding on the theory that it fails to comply with federal legislation and regulations. 7 Successful litigation is
then met with changes in the federal law that originally provided a
basis for the challenge. Finally, a new round of litigation is brought,
challenging the federal change and state responses, and the entire
cycle may be repeated.
This cycle is clearly apparent in the litigation and regulatory
changes concerning the status of tax refunds in determining eligibility and need for AFDC assistance. 8 A federal regulation formerly
provided that only income actually available for current use on a
regular basis could be considered in making those determinations.9
Many states treated tax refunds as countable income, thereby reducing or denying benefits. Hawaii followed this practice, which was
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
1 See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
4

REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WEL-

(1971). Piven and Cloward argue that expansive welfare policies are implemented to
stem civil disorder and restrictive ones are used to enforce work norms.
6 For a general discussion of the importance of these principles in the law see L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65, 79-81 (rev. ed. 1969).
1 See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
8 For a more extensive discussion of developments in tax refund treatment in determining AFDC eligibility, see Note, 1975 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 790-94 (1976).
9 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C) (1974) (repealed).
FARE
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attacked in Kaisa v. Chang.10 Attorneys from the Legal Aid Society of
Hawaii argued that tax refunds were not available on a regular basis
and could not be treated as countable income. If not treated as
income, the refunds would be a resource and potentially exempt
under the recipient's resource reserve.'" The court in Kaisa upheld
the Legal Aid Society's argument and ruled that tax refunds could
only be treated as a resource.
The decision, however, provided little cause for rejoicing-for
while the case was pending, the federal regulation was amended. At
present, it merely requires that income be available for current use
in order to be countable.1 2 Thus, when victory seemed near, the
rules of the game were changed.
Also illustrative of this welfare law cycle, are developments in
the requirement that a recipient cooperate in establishing paternity
and pursuing support payments.' 3 In the past, many states denied
public assistance where a parent refused to assist in establishing a
support obligation. These state eligibility rules were attacked as
being unconstitutional and incompatible with the Social Security
Act' 4-that Act formerly contained no such eligibility condition;
therefore, these state rules were asserted to be impermissible under
the supremacy clause.' 5
A notable case in this area is Shirley v. Lavine,' 6 which reached
the United States Supreme Court on two occasions. After a threejudge district court had invalidated a New York regulation conditioning AFDC eligibility upon cooperation in obtaining support
from absent parents, 17 the New York legislature amended the state
Social Services Law to include a provision similar to the invalidated
regulation.1 8 The legislative intent was presumably to save the regulation or else to reduce AFDC expenditures by protracting the
appeals process. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judg10

396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Hawaii 1975).

" See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975).

12 Id. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975).
3 For a more thorough examination of these developments see Note, supra note 8, at

797-802.
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). The AFDC eligibility conditions are
contained in id. § 602(a). Prior to 1975, there was no federal requirement of parental
cooperation. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
" See Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mer. sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404
U.S. 987 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mere. sub nom. Carleson v.
Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971).
16 2 CCH Pov. L. RP. 16,203 (N.D.N.Y.), vacated, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), on remand, 365
F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd percuriam sub nom. Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975).
17 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 369.2(f)(3)(ii)(e) (Aug. 31, 1971).
18 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 101-a(2) to (3) (McKinney 1976).
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ment of the district court and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the New York amendment. Whereupon, the
district court again invalidated the New York eligibility condition as
being incompatible with the Social Security Act, despite an intervening amendment to federal regulations that brought them largely in
line with the New York practice. The Supreme Court affirmed this
judgment of the district court, but, by that time, the Social Security
Act provision at issue had been changed. 19 Consequently, the protracted litigation bore no fruit for welfare recipients.
Adding to the frustrations of this cycle is the length of time that
states require to implement court decisions. Developments in the
legal effect of a stepfather's income upon his stepchild's AFDC
eligibility illustrate this time lag. The 1968 Supreme Court decision
in King v. Smith 20 and the HEW regulation implementing that decision appeared to clarify the law in this area. The HEW regulation
states, in part, that absent a law of general applicability requiring
stepparents to support as natural parents, states may not presume
that stepparent income is available for the support of minor stepchildren.2 1 The validity of the HEW regulation was subsequently
upheld in Leviris v. Martin.2 2 Nevertheless, states having no such law
of general applicability continued to include stepparent income in
determining AFDC eligibility, even where the income was not in fact
available.2 3
In New York, for example, although no law requires stepparents to support as natural parents, stepparent income was automatically included in determining welfare budgets. 4 This practice was
invalidated by the state supreme court in Uhrovick v. Lavine,2 5 and
the decision was unanimously affirmed on appeal.2 6 In view of the
weakness of the state's claim 2

7

and the inevitability of a final decision

See 42 .I.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
2
2' 45 C.F.R. § 33.90(a) (1975).
22 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
23 See, e.g., Guither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd fem., 409 U.S. 1070
(1972).
24 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(a)(2) (as amended Dec. 12, 1974).
25 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
18,054 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
26 43 App. Div. 2d 481, 352 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1974), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 892, 324 N.E.2d 360,
364 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1974).
27 In Freda v. Lavine, No. 73-C-362 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 1973), vacated, 494 F.2d 107 (2d
Cir. 1974), the district court stated: "It appears quite clear to this court that New York does not
have a 'state law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to
the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children.' " Id.
at 13, quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1975). Although the court of appeals required the district
court to abstain pending the state court's resolution of Uhrovick (see note 26supra), this seemed
19

20
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against it, New York's pursuit of appellate review can only be explained as an attempt to save AFDC expenditures during the period
in which the state was entitled to an automatic stay of the lower
court's determination.2 8 Although the Supreme Court had decided
Lewis in 1970, it was not until February 1975 that the New York State
Department of Social Services recognized the validity of that decision.2 9
Most future litigation in the welfare area will be handled within
the framework of the Legal Services Corporation. In this issue, the
two major analyses of the Corporation document the compromises
that were necessary to preserve legal representation for the nation's
poor. Following an introduction by Dean Roger Cramton, Chairman
of the Board of the Legal Services Corporatioin, an Article by Warren George explains the history of the LSCA, and a Note analyzes
the constitutionality of restrictions it places upon legal services attorneys and clients. 30 One of the most interesting portions of the
George Article is his discussion of the controversy and compromise
surrounding backup centers-the offices that provide special litigation, training, and clearinghouse services. 3 1 Recent action by the
Board of the Legal Services Corporation has added another chapter
since that Article was written.
On March 5, 1976, the Board adopted a resolution 32 that deals
with the funding of backup or support centers in light of section
2996e(a)(3) of the LSCA, commonly called the Green Amendment. 33 Under the terms of the resolution, contracts will be made
with support centers to provide legal assistance to eligible clients; the
"centers ...will be limited to client counseling and representational
to be an academic application of the abstention doctrine without any true inquiry into whether
a meritorious question existed concerning the interpretation of state law.
28 See N.Y. Civ. PPinc. LAiv § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
29 See letter from Abe Lavine, Commissioner of N.Y. State Department of Social Services,
to County Departments of Social Services, Transmittal No. 75 ADM-21 (Feb. 26, 1975).
3' George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 681 (1976);
Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Legal Services CorporationAct, 61

L. REv. 734 (1976).
31See George, supra note 30, at 709-22.
32 41 Fed. Reg. 10,271 (1976).
" [T]he Corporation is authorized ... to undertake directly and not by grant or contract,
the following activities relating to the delivery of legal assistance(A)research,
(B) training and technical assistance, and
(C) to serve as a dearinghouse for information.
42 U.S.C. § 2996e(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). The restriction imposed by this section was first
proposed in an amendment offered by Representative Edith Green. See 119 CONG. REC.
20,717 (1973).
CORNELL
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activities, professional responsibility activities in accordance with the
Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, and such 'housekeeping' activities as are normally carried on by
law offices. 3 4 Support centers are prohibited from using Corporation funds for research, training, technical assistance, and clearinghouse activities that are not part of providing legal assistance to
eligible clients. In adopting this resolution, the Board has rejected
interpretations that the Green Amendment totally abolishes the
35
backup centers.
Pursuant to the terms of the resolution, contracts will be
negotiated with existing backup centers to allow continued specialized assistance to individual clients. These centers, however, will
not be able to continue general research, training, and technical
assistance, and their budgets will be reduced by the amount that is
presently allocated to such activities. On the other hand, since the
Corporation itself may perform such activities, centers engaged
almost exclusively in this type of work will be brought within the
Corporation. It is expected that the Legal Services Training Program and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association Technical Assistance Project will be transferred to the Corporation's Washington headquarters. The paralegal Institute will have its training
activities transferred to the Corporation, and other programs may
be transferred as well. The ClearinghouseReview, while remaining in
36
Chicago, has already been transferred to the Corporation.
Although the Board's action provides relief for these specialized
offices, its action, constrained by the Green Amendment, is not
without deleterious effect upon the backup centers. These changes
in the Corporation may cause many backup center employees to
leave the legal services program. Some may not wish to relocate;
others, who have litigated, assisted in training programs, and performed general research, may not wish to continue in only one of
these functions; still more may leave because their independence has
been threatened by this bifurcation.
On December 16, 1975, H.R. 10799 was approved by the House
Committee on the Judiciary.3 7 This bill would amend the LSCA to
31 41 Fed. Reg. 10,271 (1976).
11 See George, supra note 30, at 716.
36 Statements about restructuring the backup centers and their activities are based upon a
Memorandum to the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation from Thomas
Ehrlich, undated (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review), and conversations with Roger C.
Cramton, Chairman of the Board of Directors.
37 H.R. 10799, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See 121 CONG. REc. D1546 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1975).
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allow the Corporation to undertake research, training, technical
assistance, and clearinghouse functions by grant or by contract. It
would allow the Board the option of continuing the support centers
as they were structured prior to the Board's resolution of March 5,
1976. The speedy passage of this legislation is necessary if the
Corporation is to retain its experienced and skilled employees.
The cyclical development of welfare law, in which federal legislation and regulations are changed to accommodate previously invalidated state practices, is a source of frustration to welfare recipients. But one can hope that future actions of Congress and the
Legal Services Corporation Board will provide these persons with
effective advocates, aided by a network of well-staffed and independent backup centers.

